In his memoir, In The Place of Justice (Random House 2010), Wilbert Rideau attempts to portray himself as a “victim” but he actually opened the door to discussion about criminal liability he could have faced but never did. A Louisiana jury in 2005 convicted Rideau of manslaughter in connection with the death of Julia Ferguson. But, as we have all seen happen in TV crime dramas, Lake Charles authorities could have handcuffed Rideau and taken him back into custody following that manslaughter verdict and put him to trial for the aggravated kidnapping of Julia Ferguson.
In The Place of Justice is littered with so many embellishments, misrepresentations, and fabrications about Rideau, other people he knew, and events he was part of that it is tempting to overlook some of the other blatant hubris in the book. But there is one example of Rideau’s hallucinations about being a victim that is so laughable that it stands atop all others. It begs discussion because the mainstream book reviewers for The New York Times, NPR’s Fresh Air, and Associated Press have not done so. But I will. That’s why this website is called Wilbert Rideau-Real Story.
“And now Judge Ritchie [the state judge who presided over Rideau’s fourth murder trial in January 2005] reenters my life,” Rideau wrote. “He charges me with court costs of nearly $127,000. He decrees that despite his having declared me indigent, I am to pay for the cost of my fourth trial, because it was I who requested it. The fact that I did so because I was serving an unconstitutional sentence flowing from an unconstitutional trial is apparently immaterial, as is the fact that I served forty-four years in prison on a sentence that was dischargeable in ten and a half. Nobody is talking about reimbursing me.” [Emphasis Rideau’s]
Have you ever cracked a rotten egg and instinctively gagged from its putrid odor. Well, that’s exactly the way I felt when I read this “woe is me” self-victimization rant by Rideau. I worked with this man for nine years, side-by-side, in the same office. We shared a thousand conversations, and while I was frequently taken aback by his remarkable ability to find a way to transform himself into a “victim” in every life situation, I was simply not prepared for the arrogance he exhibited trying to turn himself into a “victim” over the court costs issue. I immediately wondered how Rideau’s editor—a gentleman named Jonathan Segal—could have been so professionally unwise, and insensitive, as to let this self-absorbed “victimization tantrum” appear in the book. While he may not be a legal guru, it is an issue the editor should have questioned on the grounds of taste alone, if not for Rideau’s own protection. It certainly leaves an indelible stain on Segal’s professional judgment.
First, let’s deal with the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in 2000 that vacated Rideau’s third murder conviction. The federal appeals court based its decision on the constitutional issue that blacks had been excluded from Rideau’s grand jury. It was purely a legal decision. The court did not say that Rideau had not committed the crime as the State of Louisiana charged. The court simply held that the State of Louisiana had convicted him through an unconstitutional process. It was the third time a federal court had reversed Rideau’s murder conviction—the other two convictions had been reversed because of excessive pretrial publicity and the systematic exclusion of jurors who did not believe in the death penalty. How many other criminal defendants in the history of this nation’s legal system had their murder convictions reversed three times?
Second, Rideau’s fourth jury in January 2005 found him guilty of the lesser charge of manslaughter. The maximum penalty for manslaughter in 1961 was twenty-one years. The jurors who sat in judgment of Rideau at that fourth trial knew who he was, his record of penal rehabilitation, and his fame as an award-winning “prison journalist” and “convict editor.” They had four choices: not guilty, guilty as charged [mandatory life sentence], manslaughter [maximum 21-years], and negligent homicide [maximum 10 years]. Jurors knew Rideau had been incarcerated for 44 years, and that if they found him “guilty as charged,” he would be returned to prison with a life sentence and never be released. They effectively anointed themselves a “pardon board” and commuted his life sentence to 21 years knowing that would immediately set him free.
There is no problem with the Rideau jury. It had every right to make that decision. My problem lies with the theme Rideau and his NAACP defense team has peddled about the killer being a “victim of the system.” It was baloney, in its worse form, at the 2005 trial and remains baloney in his memoir. By his own admission and the strategy of his defense team, Wilbert Rideau on February 16, 1961 robbed a bank in Lake Charles, Louisiana. He took all three bank employees [two women and one man] hostage. He took them to a remote area on the outskirts of Lake Charles. He wounded two of the hostages as they tried to escape. He killed the third hostage with a “cut to the neck” and a stab wound into the heart.
Rideau’s defense, as manufactured by the NAACP defense team, was that he panicked in the bank after he learned the police were en route. He took the employees hostage because he no longer had time to tie them up and leave them unharmed in the bank as he had initially planned. He took them to the remote area with every intention of turning them loose and allowing them to find their way back to town. When the two hostages tried to escape, Rideau said in his memoir that “everything [went] to hell” and “the gun went off, unintentionally or not—I didn’t know which. Everything happened very fast … like a blur. Hickman [the male hostage] ran, and I started firing until the gun wouldn’t shoot anymore. Both women fell. Mrs. Ferguson got up. I ran to her and stabbed her. I was acting on panic and impulse.”
I don’t believe Rideau’s version of the events and explained why in previous posts (here and here). However, based on the account provided by Rideau in his memoir, I will point out exactly why the State of Louisiana does not owe him a single copper penny.
First, Rideau admits to robbing the bank. He could have been charged with armed robbery as well as the federal offense of bank robbery in 1961. He would have faced a maximum 30-year sentence on the armed robbery charge; and a maximum of 25 years (if I’m not mistaken) on the federal bank robbery charge. With the state good-time statute (Act 426) in place in 1961, Rideau would have had to serve approximately 16 years on a 30-year armed robbery sentence. On the federal bank robbery charge, he would have had to serve approximately 15 years. A total of 31 years for the two robbery charges.
Second, Rideau could have been charged with manslaughter for the killing of Julia Ferguson. The maximum sentence for that offense in 1961 was, in fact, 21 years as Rideau pointed out. Under Act 426, Rideau would have had to serve approximately 12 years on that sentence (not ten years and six months as he stated in his memoir).
Third, Rideau could have been charged with two counts of “attempt” to either murder or manslaughter Jay Hickman and Dora McCain. He would have faced at least ten years on each “attempt” count and, under Act 426, would have had to serve approximately 11 years on both counts.
Fourth, Rideau could have been charged with aggravated kidnapping which carried a mandatory life sentence absent a death penalty verdict. In 1961 it was customary for a person serving a life sentence in Louisiana to serve 10 and six months (it was called the “10/6 life”) before the sitting governor routinely commuted the sentence to “time-served”).
In 1961 Louisiana law required a trial judge to impose “consecutive” sentences unless he specifically ordered them to be served concurrently. So, based on the five state offenses Rideau could have been charged with—armed robbery, manslaughter, kidnapping, and two attempts to kill—he would have had to serve at least 50 years to discharge, with “goodtime,” all five of the maximum sentences that would have surely been imposed because of the sheer gravity of the offenses. Then he would have been transferred to federal custody where he would have had to serve yet another 15 years on the federal bank robbery conviction. That would make a grand total of 65 years of actual penal incarceration in state and federal prison—21 more years than the 44 years he actually served in the Louisiana prison system on the murder conviction.
It has long been held by the courts that both state and federal governments can convict a defendant for a single armed robbery of a bank—crimes Rideau readily admitted to. And he could have been separately tried and convicted for manslaughter in connection with Julia Ferguson’s death and for two counts of “attempt” to kill, either by means of murder or manslaughter, Dora McCain and Jay Hickman. These charges could have been brought through a bill of information and not a grand jury indictment thereby eliminating the exclusion of blacks from the Lake Charles grand jury system issue. These three charges—the killing Julia Ferguson and the attempts to kill Jay Hickman and Dora McCain—occurred after the bank robbery, and, therefore, were not part of the armed robbery because they did not occur during that predicate offense.
Finally, the State of Louisiana could have tried and sought the death penalty against Rideau for aggravated kidnapping on the legal theory that the killing of Julia Ferguson occurred during the kidnapping offense. The State could have easily shown that Rideau took all three bank employees hostage and drove them to the remote area outside of Lake Charles. These are two indisputable facts. The death penalty question would have been whether Julia Ferguson was still a kidnapping victim after Dora McCain and Jay Hickman tried to escape. It is an indisputable fact that Rideau started shooting once McCain and Hickman fled. He emptied his gun at them, wounding both. He then rushed over and stabbed Julia Ferguson to death. The jury could have reasonably concluded that Ferguson was killed while still a kidnap victim and returned a death penalty verdict based on that finding.
Rideau complained like an aggrieved “victim” in his memoir because Judge Ritchie assessed him with a $127,000 court cost fee. The legal irony is that the State of Louisiana could have sought and secured an indictment for the aggravated kidnapping offense after the manslaughter verdict was rendered in January 2005. There was, and remains, no statute of limitation on for aggravated kidnapping. And even had there been a statute of limitations, Rideau own actions of seeking a new trial after each of his three murder convictions would have toll any limitations on the prosecution of the kidnapping charge. I’m sure that such an indictment would have stirred up a howl of protest from the NAACP and its lead attorney George Kendall who would have rode his “race pony” from one end of Lake Charles to another vowing to fight off yet another vestige of racism from the “Old South.”
Such an indictment would also have faced serious constitutional challenge for speedy trial, prosecutorial vindictiveness, and double jeopardy violations. Of the three challenges, the only serious challenge would have been the double jeopardy violation. Since Rideau’s arrest in 1961, Louisiana courts have generally frowned upon attempts to try an individual for two offenses flowing from a single criminal transaction. Rideau would have argued that since he had already been convicted of manslaughter in connection with the killing of Julia Ferguson, he could not be convicted of aggravated kidnapping because both offenses occurred during the same criminal transaction. To defeat argument, the State would have had to show that the kidnapping and killing of Julia Ferguson were two separate offenses.
Rideau’s own testimony during the 2005 trial gave the State a strong case that the kidnapping and killing of Julia Ferguson were separate offenses. He testified he had no intention of harming the hostages; that he planned to release them once they got to the remote area outside of town. Dora McCain and Jay Hickman attempted to escape before Rideau could release them. He started shooting at them as they fled. Thus, the aggravated kidnapping ceased to exist at that point. He was shooting at them not to regain control of them as hostages but in reaction to their flight, regardless whether the decision to shoot at them was motivated by either panic or impulse,
Rideau testified that after McCain and Hickman attempted to flee, he rushed over and stabbed Julia Ferguson. He did not kill her because she tried to flee. He did not kill her because she was a hostage who could identify him. He killed her, he testified, because he “panicked” after McCain and Hickman tried to flee. Her manslaughter death, therefore, was not part of the kidnapping. It was a separate act caused by Rideau’s own admitted panic that seized him after McCain and Hickman tried to flee. Thus, the State in 2005 could have reasonably argued against double jeopardy because, by Rideau’s own testimony, the killing of Julia Ferguson was a separate panic-impulse attack apart from the aggravated kidnapping offense—in other words, legally speaking, the two offenses were not part of the same criminal transaction.
Bottom line is this: Wilbert Rideau, by his own admission, committed six felony offenses (five state and one federal) on February 16, 1961. One person was killed and two others were grievously wounded during the commission of those six offenses. The 44 years he served in the Louisiana prison system for the single murder offense was not, by any reasonable stretch of the imagination, an “injustice” as the “famed prison journalist” claims in his memoir. This killer owes not only his victims, but the entire State of Louisiana an apology for having the narcissistic audacity to write that “nobody is talking about reimbursing [him]” for the 44 years he was incarcerated—and his Random House editor’s professional integrity should be called into question for allowing this major book publisher to release such an offensive and totally unfounded little self-pitying rant.
Rideau’s “big shot” prison days are over. He needs to get a real life: an honest job, paying taxes, and embracing every day anonymity. Terry Gross may see him as a “victim” on NPR’s Fresh Air, but in the real world where the air is not so often “fresh,” he is just another “ex-con” who should consider himself extremely lucky that he even has a life outside the prison world.